CFP: Virtue and Nature (Italy) (4/10/03; 5/15/03)

University of Padua
Department of Philosophy

University of Udine
Department of Philosophical, Historical and Social Sciences

Call for Papers

VIRTUE AND NATURE

One Day Conference

Thursday the 15th of May 2003
10:00-18:00
Stefanini Room
Liviano Palace
Piazza Capitaniato 7
Padua, Italy

Invited Speakers:
Thomas D'Andrea (Wolfson College, Cambridge)
Mario Ricciardi (University of Milan)

Call for papers
Proposed papers will be selected by anonymous referees, and should reach=20
the organisers by the 10th of April 2003. Each refereed paper will take a=20
hour, half a hour for presentation and half a hour for discussion. Proposed=
=20
papers need to be in Italian or in English and they should concern the=20
conference topic (which is explained below). The call is open to everyone,=
=20
especially doctoral students, post-doctoral and research fellows.

Travel bursaries may be offered to the authors of accepted papers.

Please, submit proposals through e-mail or traditional mail.

Gabriele De Anna
Dipartimento di Scienze Filosofiche e Storico-Sociali
Universit=E0 degli studi di Udine
Via Petracco 3
33100 Udine
E-mail: gabriele.deanna_at_dsfss.uniud.it

Conference Topic

In the last couple of decades, Virtue Ethics has been one of the main=20
voices in the philosophical debates in English-speaking countries.=20
Initially, it was presented as a third view, between the traditional=20
contenders in those debates, i.e. consequentialism and deontologism.=20
Against the theses that the good concerns the consequences of action or=20
that actions themselves have ethical value, the supporters of Virtue Ethics=
=20
sustained the Aristotelian idea that an action can only be valued as good=20
or bad in relation to the character of the agent who executes it. In other=
=20
words, an action is not good in itself, nor for its consequences, but it=20
good as far as it is what - in those particular circumstance - an agent who=
=20
has a good character would do. An agent has a good character, on the other=
=20
hand, when she has behavioural dispositions which allow her to flourish as=
=20
a human being. This position rests on the assumption that human beings may=
=20
be granted capacities which they possess potentially because of their=20
nature, and which can only be actualised through the formation of a good=20
character. It is, thus, a form of ethical perfectionism, although is not a=
=20
strictly intellectualist form of perfectionism. Moral excellence, indeed,=20
is quite unrelated to rational reflection on the good, but it depends on=20
education and the imitation of happy forms of life which one may recognise=
=20
around oneself.
The latter trait gave Virtue Ethics a strong social and political=20
connotation, which became evident especially in Communitarians, as were=20
initially labelled some authors who - in general - have subsequently=20
refused that name (e.g., A. McIntyre, C. Taylor, M. Sandel, and M. Walzer).=
=20
Traditional Communitarianism, however,- as Sandel himself has recently=20
pointed out in the preface to the second edition of his Liberty and the=20
Limits of Justice - has to face the problem that it does not seem to have=20
the resources to overcome potentially inconsistent forms of ethical=20
relativism, since it ends up reducing human perfection to the various forms=
=20
of life which have actually been realised in the cultural traditions of=20
different communities. Objective criteria which may allow trans-cultural=20
judgements seem out of the reach. In this context, human nature seems the=20
only possible base on which to ground the desired criteria, and virtue=20
theorists have recently focused on this possibility. Some have attempted to=
=20
retrieve the traditional (Aristotelian and Thomistic) metaphysical notion=20
of human nature (cf. M. Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality,=20
Cambridge, 2002, and recent work by Robert George). Others have=20
reinterpreted that notion at the light of the recent acquisitions of=20
biology and psychology (cf. A. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals,=20
London, 1999). The debate is currently focusing on questions such as the=20
following: can the metaphysical notion of human nature be spelled out in a=
=20
coherent and satisfying way? What is the relationship between the=20
metaphysical notion of human nature and the acquisitions of biology and=20
psychology? Assuming that there is a human nature - i.e., that humans share=
=20
common essential properties -, how can it be used as a ground for rational=
=20
arguments attempting to show what perfections constitute human flourishing,=
=20
and, thus, substantiate virtue? What is the role of the individual traits=20
of a person (which are not identical to those which she shares with all=20
other humans) in determining her flourishing?
The debate on these themes is still alive and it may be expected to attract=
=20
an even greater attention in the near future. In fact, it offers the=20
possibility to link together various perspectives and various areas of=20
philosophy, and thus a wide variety of philosophical possibilities needs to=
=20
be investigated. The conference intends to offer an original contribution=20
to this debate.

For further information, please contact the organisers:
Antonio Da Re (antonio.dare_at_unipd.it)
Gabriele De Anna (gabriele.deanna_at_dsfss.uniud.it)

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Received on Sun Mar 09 2003 - 17:58:50 EST